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International Contractualism Revisited: Non-Pecuniary
Remedies under the Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard
Patrick J. Rodriguez

Abstract
For years, the international investment regulatory regime has puzzled onlookers with its
complexity. Because the system is defined by its vast network of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), the rights and obligations of foreign investors differ greatly from those of all other
participants in international trade. At the heart of this confusion is the fair and equitable
treatment (FET) standard. While in theory the FET standard purports to promote global
economic growth through the broad protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing
nations, the standard’s inherent vagueness leaves arbitration tribunals with little guidance to
resolve investor-state conflicts. At the same time, concerns over private tribunals’ ability to pass
judgment over the policy decisions of sovereign states threatens the legitimacy of the process, thereby
limiting the remedies available to wronged investors.
By reconciling the FET standard with the powers of arbitration tribunals, this Comment
seeks to provide practitioners greater clarity as to the ability of international law in remedying
controversies between states and individual investors. As such, a survey of the relevant treaties
and accompanying tribunal decisions has yielded the following conclusions: (i) notwithstanding
any radical shift in international arbitral jurisprudence, heterogeneities in treaty drafting, namely
the decision to integrate the FET standard with customary international law (CIL), have
defeated the hope of synthesizing a unified theory of FET; (ii) despite ambiguity in the FET
standard, violations of the standard would benefit from the imposition of non-pecuniary remedies;
and (iii) a contractual approach in the application of these non-pecuniary remedies will strengthen
the reasoning of arbitral decisions. By utilizing the principles of contract law, tribunals will be
better positioned to preserve their legitimacy, remedy ongoing violations of international treaties,
and provide states and investors with predictable statements of law.



J.D. Candidate, 2018, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank
Professor Adam Chilton and the Chicago Journal of International Law staff for their comments and
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The world of international investment arbitration is in a crisis of legitimacy.
The second half of the twentieth century has seen the rise of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) as the primary regulatory guarantee of foreign-investor rights.
Nonetheless, the proliferation of these treaties has slowed in recent years.1 Several
reasons could explain this development. First, when about three thousand of these
treaties presently exist, there is a limit to how many new combinations of countries
can reach a new agreement.2 Second, and perhaps more important, is the general
sense that BITs are failing to accomplish their goal, namely the stimulation of
global economic development through foreign investment. This perception has
even caused several countries to abandon the BIT model of regulation
completely.3 For many states, the political costs of the regime are beginning to
outweigh the economic benefits.
At the center of the controversy is the fair and equitable treatment (FET)
standard. A vaguely written phrase appearing in nearly every bilateral investment
agreement currently in force, this standard has puzzled commentators and
tribunals for years. Nonetheless, the term, appearing in the vast majority of
complaints filed, is a staple of foreign investor arbitral litigation.4 For many, the
hope of unifying tribunal treatment of the FET standard has all but evaporated as
foreign investors (usually corporations) have a variety of BITs from which to
choose. As explained below, heterogeneities in BIT drafting confer on investors
differing rights and legal obligations, thereby resulting in forum shopping. At the
same time, arbitration tribunals risk infringing on the host state’s ability to regulate
itself without interference from international institutions.
One solution to this problem is the so-called “contractual approach.” The
general purpose of the contractual approach is to strengthen the legitimacy of the
tribunal and reduce the untoward influence of forum shopping by applying the
tools and principles of contract law. This Comment seeks to contribute to the
discussion by extending the analytical reach of the contractual approach to
remedies. Specifically, I argue that international agreements do permit the use of
non-pecuniary measures (such as an injunction) in remedying violations of the
FET standard, and that, in some cases, such measures will produce better
outcomes than monetary damages.
This Comment suggests that non-pecuniary remedies offer an alternative
avenue for parties in FET litigation. Section II provides a brief overview of the
1

Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of the States, 104
AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 191–92 (2010).

2
3

Id.
Id.

4

Id. at 180.
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development and structure of the international arbitral regime by comparing
investment regulatory architecture with that of more traditional notions of
international trade. Section III provides an outline of the current problems and
solutions posed in interpreting the FET standard, including a summary of the
functional merits of the contractual approach. Finally, Section IV applies existing
international law as well as the contractual approach to non-pecuniary remedies.
In particular, I address the basis for non-pecuniary remedies in international law
and point to examples where an injunction may aid the investment regime.

II. I NTERNA TIONAL I NVESTMENT A RBITRA TION
Following the end of World War II, the international community sought to
promote economic development by substantially reducing tariffs and other
barriers to trade.5 The logic underlying this impetus towards free trade is grounded
in long-standing economic principles and is not seriously contested as a matter of
policy.6 Put simply, if one country is more efficient at producing a good or service
than another country, both countries can benefit by specializing in their respective
comparative advantage and trading at an economic surplus. In reality, however,
this classical (or Ricardian7) model of international trade does not accurately
describe all the circumstances where trade may be beneficial. For example, the
introduction of transaction costs (say, in the form of the cost of transportation)
may make trade infeasible even when one country has a comparative advantage
over another. In such a situation, the Ricardian model would conclude that a
beneficial trade would be impossible.
One of the most popular solutions to the existence of these transaction costs
is foreign direct investment (FDI).8 In general, FDI refers to the process through
which nationals of one state own and operate businesses in another state. As long
as a comparative advantage is portable, a firm can maintain the gains won from
trade by establishing a business in a foreign country. Thus, the transaction costs

5

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT] (recognizing that the contracting parties are dedicated to “raising the standards
of living, ensuring full employment and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods”).

6

7

See generally DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817);
Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 49 (1998). For a discussion of some of the counterarguments to popular criticisms of free
trade, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 6–20 (3d ed. 2005).
See generally RICARDO, supra note 6.

8

TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 6, at 442–43.
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accompanying the negotiation of trade deals and the transportation of goods
across international borders would be greatly reduced.9
As relevant to the discussion below, the distinction between FDI and
traditional forms of international trade has legal as well as economic
consequences. Most importantly, international trade (through which an individual
of one state seeks to exchange goods, services, or currency with an individual of
another state) is regulated primarily through multilateral trade agreements, namely
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements.10 On the other hand, FDI is
regulated largely through BITs, which individual states negotiate on a state-bystate basis.11 The growth in the use of BITs closely followed the explosion in
foreign investment at the end of the twentieth century. Between 1990 and 2000,
foreign investment quadrupled.12 During the same period, the number of BITs
grew from five hundred to two thousand.13 Presently, the current number of BITs
is estimated to be three thousand.14 The underlying economic reasoning for this
boom is relatively clear; capital-importing countries sought to stimulate the inflow
of foreign investment by affording potential investors protection from the hazards
accompanying political instability and high economic volatility.15
9

Critics of FDI suggest that this form of capital exportation is undesirable because it contributes to
income inequality within the capital-exporting nation. Id. at 12. Indeed, President Trump has
identified the outflow of U.S.-based factories as a central international economic concern. Binyamin
Appelbaum et al., Donald Trump’s Inaugural Speech, Annotated, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/78NA-S566. While it is true that low-income American earnings have decreased
relative to high-income American earnings in recent years, most empirical studies attribute this
change largely to technological development and declining rates of unionization. TREBILCOCK &
HOWSE, supra note 6, at 13. To the extent that such declines in low-income earnings are caused by
the outsourcing of low-skilled jobs to other countries, the problem is distributive, and, as a result,
it is unlikely that trade and investment protectionism is the clear policy solution. Protectionist tools
like tariffs and import quotas preserve domestic jobs only at the expense of higher prices paid by
consumers, thereby restricting the total amount of goods and services consumers can enjoy. Id. at
177–78. Other domestic tools, such as the income tax system, may be better suited to address these
distributive concerns without disturbing the socially beneficial effects of international competition.

10

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter WTO].

11

This was not always the case. Before the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the GATT regulated
some elements of international investment. A more comprehensive attempt came in 1997 with the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, but, for various reasons, the participating states withdrew
their support for the treaty in 1998. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 6, at 452–60.

12

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1
(3d ed. 2005).

13

Id.
Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 295,
302 (2015).
Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT xxvii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).

14

15
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As a result of this ad hoc development of the BIT regulatory regime, foreign
direct investors are entitled to vastly different rights and remedies as compared to
other participants in international trade. In addition to enumerating several
specific obligations that a host country must provide a foreign investor, including
the FET standard,16 BITs also provide for a unique enforcement mechanism for
substantive rights. Whereas the WTO agreements rely upon a Dispute Settlement
Body composed of WTO Members to adjudicate trade disputes, BITs
overwhelmingly call for private arbitration tribunals through the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).17 Furthermore, BITs
permit individuals and corporations to sue the host state directly as opposed to
requiring intervention on behalf of the foreign investor by its home state.18
Because these treaties allow aggrieved individuals to bring private claims, BITs
abridge the conventional requirement that only states can enforce international
law. Accordingly, “[t]he result is dispute resolution which is arbitration in
procedural terms, but which in substance has been said to share more
characteristics of the direct right of action before human rights courts.”19
This complex network of international obligations implicates fundamental
questions about the balance between state sovereignty and investor protection as
well as the role of private arbitration tribunals in the creation and enforcement of
international law. Unlike, for example, common law courts bound by the principle
of stare decisis, arbitration tribunals are not required to respect the decisions of past
tribunals as precedent. While some commentators have suggested that arbitration
tribunals have developed a consistent standard with which to interpret these

16

17

18

19

Whether these treaties are effective at promoting FDI is an empirical question that has yielded
mixed results. See id. And even if BITs do encourage FDI, the effect on gross domestic product
(GDP) can be limited if other infrastructural issues within the host nation are left unaddressed.
Recent empirical literature emphasizes that while FDI often results in growth in the capitalimporting country’s GDP, the size of this effect often depends on the host country’s financial
market development, institutional development, and macroeconomic policies. See generally Polpat
Kotrajaras et al., Does FDI Enhance Economic Growth?: New Evidence from East Asia, 28 ASEAN ECON.
BULL. 183 (2011).
Other protections include prompt and adequate compensation for expropriation, freedom from
unreasonable discrimination, most-favored-nations treatment for investors, and assured full
protection and security of investments. Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 15, at xxxvii.
Alexandra R. Harrington, Comment, They Fought for Trade but Did Trade Win?: An Analysis of Trends
Among Trade Disputes Brought by WTO Member States Before the WTO Dispute Resolution Body, 16 MICH.
ST. J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (2007). If either of the relevant states is not an ICSID member, the case will
appear before the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-F.I.L.J. 232, 237 (1995).
Paulsson, supra note 17. Some, but not all, BITs call for aggrieved individuals to exhaust local
remedies before turning to international arbitration tribunals. Id. at 239–40.
CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES 5 (2007).
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treaties,20 the individualized nature of BITs weighs against the notion that
tribunals can rely on universal principles of investment law to resolve every case.
After all, international law requires terms to be interpreted in accordance with
their “ordinary meaning.”21 As discussed below with respect to both the FET
standard and available remedies, heterogeneities in treaty drafting may limit the
ability of tribunals to apply the reasoning involved with one BIT to another.
Furthermore, inconsistent application of BIT protections can incentivize forum
shopping. If the investor is a multinational corporation, it may have a number of
BITs under which it can pursue a claim. If one BIT has been interpreted in the
past more favorably than others, the investor will focus its efforts on those
favorable provisions. States have responded to this behavior by limiting the use
of BITs in a number of ways. One method is increasing reliance on regional trade
and investment agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)22 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).23 Another
solution is simply to amend BITs to reflect the policy preferences of the
contracting states rather than those of the investors or arbitration tribunals.24
Nonetheless, the persistence of BITs as the main form of foreign investment
regulation leaves investors and arbitration tribunals with a substantial ability to
shape domestic policy. As a result, this Comment discusses an unfamiliar power:
the use of non-pecuniary measures in relieving violations of the FET standard.

III. T HE F AIR AND E QUITABLE T REATMENT S TANDARD
A. An Overview of the FET Standard
Although referenced in early attempts to adopt multilateral trade and
investment instruments, the FET standard is foremost the product of the

20

21

22

23

24

See, for example, Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 43 (2010).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987, 31 I.L.M. 506.
For example, the United States Model BIT equates “fair and equitable treatment” with the
minimum standard of treatment given to foreign nationals under customary international law.
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2012),
https://perma.cc/NS27-S727 [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
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increasing network of BITs.25 The term became prevalent after it first appeared in
the Havana Charter of 1948.26 Although the Charter never became law, the
concept proved influential on the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention27 and the
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.28 The AbsShawcross Convention was one of many failed international attempts at a
multilateral investment agreement.29 By incorporating the notion of fair and
equitable treatment, the authors intended to express “fundamental principles of
international law regarding the treatment of the property, rights, and interests of
aliens,” which had “a broad basis in the practice of civilized states and the findings
of international tribunals.”30 The international community tried to articulate a
multilateral standard again in the OECD Draft Convention in 1967.31 There,
Comment 4 of the Draft explained that “fair and equitable treatment” requires
conduct that “conforms in effect to the ‘minimum standard’ which forms part of
customary international law.”32
After Switzerland first integrated the FET standard into its BIT program in
1961,33 the term’s appearance became a staple of BIT drafting. 34 Currently, the
vast majority of BITs require that some form of “fair and equitable treatment” be
given to foreign investors, and, as of 2008, international tribunals have issued over
25

For a thorough history of the incorporation of the FET standard into BITs, see generally Stephen
Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 99 (1999); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
HISTORY, POLICY AND INTERPRETATION (2010).

26

Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization art. 11(2)(a)(i), Mar. 24, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 26 (calling for international
agreements “to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and
technology brought from one Member country to another”).

27

Herman Abs & Lord Hartley Shawcross, Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 9 J. PUB. L. 116, 116
(1960) (“Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the
nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most constant protection and
security within the territories of the other Parties and the management, use, and enjoyment thereof
shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures.”).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property, art. 1(a), Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117, 119 [herein after OECD Draft
Convention].

28

29

George K. Foster, Recovering “Protection and Security”: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten
Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1095, 1138 (2012).

30

Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table,
9 J. PUB. L. 115, 119 (1960).

31

Foster, supra note 29, at 1139.
OECD Draft Convention, supra note 28, at 15, cmt. 4(a).

32
33

Treaty Relating to the Protection and the Encouragement of Investments of Capital, Switz.-Tunis.,
art. 1, Dec. 2, 1961, RO 1964.

34

Vandevelde, supra note 20, at 6.
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fifty awards interpreting the standard.35 Because only a fraction of ICSID tribunal
awards are actually published, a comprehensive survey of FET treatment in these
opinions is impossible.36 Regardless, the FET standard is one of the most
commonly cited provisions in international investment arbitration.37 Despite the
term’s ubiquity, tribunals, practitioners, and observers have struggled to identify a
consistent meaning for the standard. As such, the following subsections describe
the current state of the FET standard as well as competing interpretations as to
what is or should be its meaning.

B. FET and Customary International Law
A frequent question arising out of the study of the FET standard is whether
the provision simply incorporates customary international law (CIL)38 concerning
the minimum standard of treatment of foreign nationals. U.S. BIT policy explicitly
adopts CIL in the text of its bilateral and regional investment agreements. For
example, the U.S.-Uruguay BIT provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord to covered
investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”39 In particular, the
provision “prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of the
treatment of aliens.”40
International courts and tribunals developed the minimum standard of
treatment not for international trade and investment but rather for the treatment
of individuals. Thus, it is unsurprising that much of the existing case law on the
minimum standard of treatment comes from criminal incidents. The Neer v. United
Mexican States41 case in 1926 demonstrates the deferential nature of this aspect of
CIL.42 In Neer, the U.S. claimed Mexico violated the minimum standard of
35

Id. at 44.

36

Id. at 44 n.2.
Id.

37
38

Experts have defined the development of CIL as the “process of continuous [state] interaction”
through which international practice gives rise to “expectations of pattern and uniformity in
decision . . . commonly regarded as law.” Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT’L L., 356, 357, 358 n.7 (1955). For a discussion explaining
how state expectations become binding law, see Roni Cohen, Regulating Hate Speech: Nothing
Customary About It, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 229 (2014). To qualify as international law, a norm must (1)
engender widespread and uniform adherence among nations (usus), and (2) impose upon nations a
sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Id. at 233.

39

Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 5, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 268.

40
41

Id.
Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (Gen. Claims Comm’n 1926).

42

Id.
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treatment because it failed to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the
death of a U.S. national. In holding that Mexico did not violate the standard, the
Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission described the standard as such:
[T]he propriety of the governmental acts should be put to the test of
international standards. . . . [T]he treatment of an alien, in order to
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage,
to bad faith, to willful neglect of standards that every reasonable and
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the
insufficiency proceeds from the deficient execution of an intelligent law
or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower the
authorities to measure up to international standards is immaterial.43
With this understanding of the minimum standard of treatment, it is clear
why states would be eager to connect the FET standard to CIL. Under CIL, a
sovereign state has no inherent legal obligation to allow aliens or their property
within the state’s borders. Should a state permit a foreign national to enter the
country, the alien is expected to take the law “as is.”44 The minimum standard of
treatment is only violated when “the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome that offends
judicial propriety.”45 Therefore, the argument goes, if the FET standard merely
incorporates the minimum standard of treatment, states would be justified in
pursuing a variety of policies that foreign investors would find unsatisfactory.
The question posed to commentators and tribunals is whether the FET
standard, absent any objective indicia, only incorporates the minimum standard
of treatment as described above. As a textual matter, that assertion is unlikely.
States are bound by customary international law regardless of whether they choose
to incorporate it into their agreements (thereby rendering such an assurance in a
BIT superfluous), and even if the treaty stands as only an affirmation of CIL, the
choice to use the term “fair and equitable treatment” appears on its face to be an
unlikely substitute for “minimum standard of treatment” in light of the phrase’s
ordinary meaning.46 At the same time, the dictionary definitions of the terms “fair”
43
44

45

46

Id. at 61–62.
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 4 (2009).
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 11 ICSID
Rep. 361, ¶ 98 (2004) [hereinafter Waste Management].
See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 31. See also F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 244 (1981) (“The terms ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ envisage conduct which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford protection
to a greater extent and according to a much more objective standard than any previously employed
form of words. A tribunal would not be concerned with a minimum, maximum, or average
standard. It will have to decide whether in all the circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and
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and “equitable” give little guidance as to how a tribunal should dispose of any
particular case,47 and tribunals may be willing to ignore textual heterogeneities
when doing so will promote judicial economy and uniformity within the law.
Indeed, if the tribunal were to treat every textual heterogeneity as legally
relevant, any hope at a standardized application of the FET standard, regardless
of whether it invokes CIL, would be impossible. For example, while the U.S.Argentina BIT48 explicitly links FET to CIL, the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands
BIT49 does not. Even statements of the FET standard itself are inconsistent.50 The
Lithuania-Norway BIT, for example, requires that the contracting parties accord
each state’s investors with “equitable and reasonable treatment and protection.” 51

47

equitable or unfair and inequitable. No standard defined by other word is material. The terms are
to be understood and applied independently.”).
For a survey of such definitions, see Vasciannie, supra note 25, at 103–05. Given the inherent
vagueness of the terms “fair” and “equitable,” tribunals could potentially outlaw a great deal of state
practices if the tribunals choose to read the terms broadly. The Metalclad Case, Metalclad Corp. v.
The United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, (Aug. 30,
2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 209, is perhaps the best example of this expansive reading. In 1996, Metalclad
Corporation, an American company, brought a claim against Mexico for violating NAFTA’s FET
provision. Id. at ¶ 1. Metalclad argued that it failed to realize a foreign investment in Mexico because
the state of San Luis Potosí, Central Mexico denied the company a municipal construction permit
for environmental reasons. Id. The NAFTA tribunal, siding with Metalclad, concluded that Mexico
failed to “ensure a transparent and predictable framework for [Metalclad’s] business planning,”
which violated the principle of fair and equitable treatment. Id. Unhappy with the tribunal’s ruling,
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a binding interpretation requiring tribunals to consider
the minimum standard of treatment in connection with the FET standard. NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, Statement on NAFTA Article 1105 and the Availability of Arbitration Documents, (July 31,
2001), https://perma.cc/N8F7-6UAL.

48

Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Arg.-U.S., art. II(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT] (“Investment
shall at all times be afforded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security
and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than required by international law.”).

49

Agreement on the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Czech-Neth.-Slovk., art. 3(1), Apr.
29, 1991, 2242 U.N.T.S. 205 (“Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to
the investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable
measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those
investors.”).

50

Perhaps the most abstract restatement of the FET standard is the Bangladesh-Iran BIT. Agreement
on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, Bangl.-Iran, art. 4, Apr. 29, 2011,
https://perma.cc/G5X2-RWNG (providing for “fair treatment not less favourable than accorded
to its own investors or investors of any third state, whichever is more favourable”). Here, the text
of the treaty seems to incorporate a most favored nation principle in the treatment of investors.
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Lith.-Nor., art. III,
Dec. 20, 1992, 2665 U.N.T.S. 181 (“Each contracting party shall promote and encourage in its
territory investments of investors of the other contracting party and accept such investments in

51
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It is not clear textually that “reasonable” is legally equivalent to “fair.” At first
glance, the term “fair” may envisage treatment beyond that contemplated by the
ordinary meaning of “reasonable.” After all, Lithuania and Norway drafted their
BIT in 1992, well after the widespread incorporation of “fair and equitable
treatment” into global investment policy. If the two nations wished to incorporate
the standard directly, they were probably aware of how to draft it.
The textual heterogeneities become even more confused when one injects
differing languages. For example, French treaties refer to treatment that is “juste
et equitable,” and Spanish treaties call for treatment that is “justo y equitivo.”52
On the other hand, German treaties use the term “gerecht und billig behandeln.”53
Perfect translations might be impossible if a textualist tribunal is willing to humor
developmental quirks in the underlying words. And if every treaty is
distinguishable on this textual basis, then the FET standard runs the risk of
evaporating into meaninglessness. The tribunal in Parkerings-Compagniet AS v.
Lithuania54 addressed this problem directly. The claimant, a parking facilities
developer, claimed that the Lithuania-Norway BIT’s “equitable and reasonable
treatment” standard was in fact more demanding than the FET standard.55 The
tribunal dismissed this argument on the grounds that the Vienna Convention
instructs tribunals to look at the ordinary meaning of the words in “their context
and in light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”56 As a result, the tribunal
interpreted “equitable and reasonable” as equivalent to “fair and equitable.”57 The
implication of the ruling, combined with the analysis from above, is that tribunals
will tolerate these heterogeneities to a degree. When the differences in wording
are extreme (for example, if the provision specifically incorporates CIL), then
tribunals will justify a separate analysis.
Still, even when the agreement explicitly calls for the use of CIL, it is unclear
how a tribunal should apply the principle to treatment of foreign investments.

52
53

54

55
56
57

accordance with its laws and regulations and accord them equitable and reasonable treatment and
protection.”).
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 12.
See, for example, Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Madagaskar
über die gegenseitige Föderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen, Ger.-Madag., art.
2, Aug. 1, 2006, https://perma.cc/CN4B-LUJH.
Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v. Republc of Lith. (Nor. v. Lith.), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award
(Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Parkerings-Compaignet].
Id. at ¶ 198.
Id. at ¶ 275.
Id. at ¶ 278. Nonetheless, the tribunal indicated that if the claimant had introduced any evidence
that Norway and Lithuania intended a separate meaning at the time of signing, the tribunal might
have decided otherwise. Id. at ¶ 277. This type of analysis is consistent with the contractual approach
set forth infra in Section III.D.
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Custom is developed as part of a decentralized system of international law. 58
Consequently, application of CIL can be “imprecise, vague, and hard to
interpret.”59 Custom changes over time, and although the Neer case articulates a
relatively high threshold to trigger a violation of the minimum standard of
treatment of aliens, that standard may not necessarily persist through the years.60
The NAFTA Free Trade Commission sought to address the problem by issuing
the following binding interpretation:
Article 1105.1 prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment
to be afforded to investments of another Party. The concepts of “fair
and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not
require treatment . . . beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.61
As noted by one investment-law specialist, Ignacio Pinto-León, this interpretation
is troublesome because it yields three binding inferences: (1) the minimum
standard of treatment of aliens contains FET; (2) FET is part of the minimum
standard of treatment of aliens; and (3) FET does not require anything more than
complying with customary law.62 In essence, this iteration of the standard is
circular because it defines custom as FET, yet it also defines FET as nothing more
than what is required by custom.63
In summary, attempts to pin the FET standard to CIL have been mixed at
best. Without some textual indicia in the BIT to indicate that the parties intend to
restrict FET to CIL, tribunals are unlikely to make the connection. Even when
such indicia are present, tribunals are left in an analytical quandary because it is
unclear how CIL should affect the outcome of the case. In practice, this results in
the use of circular logic that ultimately tends to reduce the likelihood that a

58

59
60
61
62
63

Ignacio Pinto-León, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under International Law: Analyzing the Interpretation of
NAFTA Article 1105.1 by NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals, 15 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L. J. 3, 27
(2006); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 784 (2001).
Pinto-León, supra note 58, at 7 (internal citations omitted).
Compare Neer, supra note 41, with Waste Management, supra note 45.
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, supra note 47.
Pinto-León, supra note 58, at 9–10.
For examples of rulings employing this circular logic, see ADF Group, Inc. v. United States (Can.
v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award (Jan. 9, 2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 449 (2003); GAMI
Inv. v. Mex. (U.S. v. Mex.), final Award (Nov. 15, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 144 (2004); Loewen Grp.
v. United States, (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID
Rep. 421 (2003); Methanex Corp. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, 16 ICSID Rep. 32 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); Mondev Int’l, Ltd. v.
United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID
Rep. 181 (2002).
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complainant will prevail.64 However, the standard in these circumstances remains
highly uncertain to governments and investors, and as a result, such an
interpretation may defeat the general purpose of the investment agreement, which
is to stimulate FDI. The next subsection deals with instances where the arbitration
tribunal must dispose of the case without the mandate to employ the minimum
standard of treatment.

C. The List Approach
Without help from CIL, tribunals are left with little guidance to resolve a
dispute over the FET standard. However, tribunals (for the most part)65 have
resisted attempts to distill an answer directly from the text. While almost all
tribunals will articulate some abstract understanding of what is fair and equitable,66
they will also employ more specificity when possible. According to Professor
Rudolf Dolzer, the fundamental question is whether “the investor [was] in effect
treated in a hospitable climate in a fair manner.”67 In answering this question,
Dolzer observes a multifaceted, list-based jurisprudence that reduces the objective
conduct of the host state into several distinct categories.68 For the purposes of this
Comment, it is not necessary to enumerate every category outlined by Dolzer;
rather, I will focus on the underlying principles.
The cornerstone of the “list approach” is the ruling in Tecmed v. Mexico.69
There, the tribunal articulated an expansive list of the expectations accompanying
the obligation of fair and equitable treatment:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light
of good faith principle established by international law, requires the
Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
64

Before the NAFTA FTC imposed its mandatory interpretation, seventy-five percent of claimants
prevailed on a FET violation. Afterward, the percentage fell to 25%. Pinto-León, supra note 58, at
18.

65

See Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Rom. (Neth. v. Rom.), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award (May 6,
2013) [hereinafter Rompetrol] (stating the tribunal will “follow the ordinary meaning of the words
used, in their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the BIT”).
See, for example, Swisslion DOO Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced. (Switz. v. Maced.),
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16, Award, ¶ 273 (July 6, 2012) (adopting “the view . . . that the standard
basically ensures that the foreign investor is not unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding
circumstances, and that it is a means to guarantee justice to foreign investors”).
Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 7, 33 (2013).

66

67
68
69

Id. at 16.
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States (Spain v. Mex.), ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 130 (2003) [hereinafter Tecmed].
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transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments,
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such
regulations . . . The foreign investor also expects the host State to act
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or
permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume
its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business
activities. The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that
govern the actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the
function usually assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor
of its investment without the required compensation.70

The passage, although lengthy, warrants repeating here not only as an informative
example of the list approach but also as the most cited arbitral award on FET
jurisprudence.71 Should the objective actions of the host state violate any one of
these obligations, then the state has violated the FET standard. Implicit in the
tribunal’s reasoning is a rejection of a more textualist standard, such as that
adopted in Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania.72 This serves to address concerns
arising from heterogeneities in drafting. Furthermore, the common thread uniting
all of these subcategories, to some extent, is the investor’s legitimate expectations.
That is, states under certain circumstances are required to maintain the
expectations held by the investor at the time of its investment.
The tribunal in Suez v. Argentina73 revisited the topic and presented the
elements of the violation as the following: (1) the host state’s objective actions
informed the investor’s legitimate expectations; (2) the foreign investor relied on
those actions to its detriment; (3) the host state frustrated those expectations; (4)
the host state’s actions were without communication to or the consent of the
investor; and (5) the investor sustained damages.74 There are several ways a host
state could inform an investor’s legitimate expectations, including the appearance
of consistency and stability in the state’s legal order75 as well as the state’s

70
71
72
73

74
75

Id. at ¶ 154.
Dolzer, supra note 67, at 14.
Rompetrol, supra note 65.
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, (Spain, Fr. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liab. (July 30, 2010)
[hereinafter Suez].
Id. at ¶ 226; see also Dolzer, supra note 67, at 20.
This goes beyond political or economic stability. See, for example, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic
of Chile (Malay. v. Chile), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 21, 2007),
13 ICSID Rep. 488 (2007) (holding that Chile’s initial approval of a construction project and
subsequent withdrawal due to the state’s zoning laws constituted a violation of the FET standard).
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contractual commitments.76 Once the investor, in reliance on those legitimate
expectations, takes action, the state is obligated to maintain those circumstances.
This is not to say that the state loses its sovereign right to dictate domestic policy,
but it must do so in a manner consistent with its obligations under the investorprotection regime.77 The result, according to Dolzer, is a fact-specific balancing of
the state’s right to regulate against the investor’s legitimate expectations.78

D. The Contractual Approach
Professor Richard C. Chen distinguishes between what he terms the “public
law approach” and the “contractual approach.”79 Under the public law approach,
investors call on arbitration tribunals to pass judgment on the validity of state laws
in the same way an individual may bring a lawsuit to challenge domestic
regulations under constitutional or administrative law.80 The contractual approach,
on the other hand, calls on tribunals to treat violations of a BIT as a breach of
contract.81 Under this approach, the tribunal would apply the tools of contract
interpretation, including the use of default rules such as foreseeability doctrine and
efficient risk bearer analysis.82 Chen acknowledges that the public law approach is
the most popular approach and is acquiring general acceptance by both scholars
and tribunals (as demonstrated in the previous subsection).83 However, the
argument for a contractual approach is a functional one.84 Furthermore, because
the general text of the FET standard is vague and tribunals are not bound by
precedent, nothing short of state intervention can prevent tribunals from
endorsing the contractual approach over the public law approach.85 Therefore,
because the contractual approach is functionally and analytically superior,
tribunals would enhance their legitimacy and better serve the interest of the
76

This usually refers to either a host state’s repudiation of a contract or the violation of an umbrella
clause included in a BIT. Not all breaches of contract violate the FET standard. DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 152–54.

77

ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hung. (Cyprus v. Hung.), ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Trib., ¶ 423 (Oct. 2, 2006), 15 ICSID Rep. 534 (2006).

78

Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 67, at 28 (citing Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech (Neth. v.
Czech), Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006) 15 ICSID Rep. 250 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006) [hereinafter Saluka],
and Lemire v. Ukr. (U.S. v. Ukr.), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab.
(Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Lemire]).

79

Chen, supra note 14, at 297–99.
Id. at 297.

80
81
82

Id. at 298.
Id. at 318–35.

84

Id. at 297.
Id. at 313.

85

Id.

83
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international community by applying contract rules.86 The following paragraphs
summarize Chen’s functionality argument.
The central thesis of the functional argument is the notion that treaties
should be interpreted with regard to the parties’ intent.87 Here, Chen distinguishes
the contracting party from the aggrieved party.88 An approach that favors the
intent of the investor will unduly favor investor rights at the expense of state
sovereignty.89 Tribunals would “operate as if the only rights at stake were those of
investors and as if [they] were enforcing narrowly drawn private law contracts
divorced from public law context.”90 The solution, according to Chen, is to
reconstruct the intent of the adopting states through objective evidence.91
The contractual approach is functionally superior because it serves to
alleviate the ISCID’s crisis of legitimacy. The public law approach forces tribunals
to weigh the “incommensurable values” of state policy decisions.92 In doing so,
tribunals tend to substitute, or at least appear to substitute, their members’ policy
preferences in the place of principled and predictable application of law.93
Furthermore, by emphasizing the intent of the states, the tribunals would evaluate
the host state’s conduct with respect to the limits the state has chosen to put on
itself, thereby dismissing the notion that, under international law, the state and
investor are equals.94
Observers of the application of the FET standard can already see how
principles of contract law have affected the behavior of tribunals. For example,
the ruling in Suez almost completely mirrors the elements of common law
promissory estoppel.95 On the other hand, Chen acknowledges that adoption of
86
87

88
89

Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 315; Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1299 (2005) (“[M]ost commentators agree that the touchstone of treaty
interpretation is the intent of the parties.”); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at 340, art. 31
(stating courts and tribunals should interpret a treaty “in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose”); Parkerings-Compagniet, supra note 55, at ¶ 275.
Chen, supra note 14, at 315–16.
Id.

90

William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 297 (2010).

91

When sufficient evidence exists as to the states’ actual intent, the contractual rules described here
are not needed. Chen, supra note 14, at 316. Furthermore, the adoption of default interpretative
rules should encourage parties to be more specific during the drafting stage. Id.
Id.; see also Saluka, supra note 78; Lemire, supra note 78.

92
93
94
95

Chen, supra note 14, at 317.
Id.
See Suez, supra note 73; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
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the contractual approach requires repudiation of the public law approach, which
has dominated existing FET jurisprudence. Although rejecting the public law
approach is not illegal, its likelihood depends on a tribunal’s willingness to ignore
or refute persuasive precedent. The next Section applies the contractual approach
to circumstances not contemplated by Chen: the realm of remedies. In particular,
I analyze the extent to which the contractual approach will justify the use of nonpecuniary remedies to alleviate violations of the FET standard.

IV. A C ONTRACTUAL A PPROACH TO N ON -P ECUNIARY
R EMEDIES
The previous Sections assessed the current state of international investment
arbitration under the FET standard. As the law currently stands, a tribunal must
grapple with the competing interests of state sovereignty, investors’ rights,
economic development, and that tribunal’s own sense of legitimacy. In some
circumstances, this requires the abstract weighing of political and economic ideals.
In other circumstances, a tribunal will simply resort to unpredictably circular logic.
In the best-case scenario, the tribunal will apply reasoned, generally accepted
principles to the specific facts of a case, but as the previous Sections show,
international law often escapes such categorizations. This is especially true for the
FET standard.
The contractual approach offers a variety of tools to alleviate the ICSID’s
crisis of legitimacy. In fact, the analysis in this Section shows that the approach
will permit tribunals to reach previously unrecognized results: the ordering of nonpecuniary remedies. The argument that a tribunal may issue a non-pecuniary
remedy (that is, an order requiring the host state to engage in or refrain from
certain conduct) for FET violations flows from two premises: (1) states have
consented to the use of non-pecuniary remedies through international law; and
(2) in some circumstances, non-pecuniary remedies are a superior substitute for,
or compliment to, damages for violations of the FET standard. As demonstrated
below, the contractual approach is not necessary under international law to justify
a tribunal’s use of injunction. In fact, much existing law indicates otherwise. The
value, therefore, of the contractual approach is to provide tribunals with an
analytical toolset that provides for greater transparency and legitimate, judicially
administrable principles. The remainder of the Section is dedicated to expanding
upon these propositions in greater detail.

avoided only by enforcement of such promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.”).
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A. The Power to Order Non-Pecuniary Remedies
ICSID tribunals have always granted relief in the form of monetary damages;
however, their charter suggests a broad ability to define the contours of the
award.96 Under Article 48 of the ISCID Convention, an award must “deal with
every question submitted to the Tribunal, and state the reasons upon which it is
based.”97 Furthermore, each “award shall be binding on the parties and shall not
be subject to any appeal or any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention.”98 In other words, the Convention delegates broad authority to a
tribunal to resolve disputes brought before it, and the parties are bound to follow
the conclusions to which the tribunal arrives unless that conclusion violates
another provision in the Convention.
Nowhere in the definition of a valid award does the Convention limit the
scope of pecuniary or non-pecuniary measures. Instead, Article 54(1) dictates that
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”99
The plain meaning of the text suggests that an award may include pecuniary
obligations, and any pecuniary obligations will be treated as a final judgment in
the host state. Nothing, however, suggests that an award is limited strictly to
pecuniary obligations, and nothing suggests that a non-pecuniary award would be
any less binding on a state.100
A survey of relevant tribunal decisions supports this point. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered specific performance in lieu of pecuniary relief
on numerous occasions.101 So too has the international community tolerated the
issuance of non-pecuniary relief in non-ICSID arbitration.102 In comparing these
96

97

98
99
100

101

102

MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 341–43; Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID
Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L 325, 325–26 (2004).
ICSID Convention Regulation and Rules art. 48, April 10 2006, 1958, https://perma.cc/PK77DZZG [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
Id. at art. 53.
Id. at art. 54(1).
Professor Schreuer’s analysis of the Convention’s travaux préparatoires reinforces this argument.
Schreuer, supra note 96, at 325–26.
See, for example, Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13);
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (June 15); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14 (June 27); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14); LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466 (June 27).
See, for example, Arbitral Award in the Martini Case (It. v. Venez.), 3 May 1930, (1931) 25 Am. J.
Int’l. L. 554; Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Rainbow Warrior Affair
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cases to those before the ICSID, the critical question is whether the nature of the
ICSID Convention or the claim itself (that is, because BITs permit individuals to
sue states directly) is substantially different than the ICJ or other tribunals.
The answer, according to ICSID tribunals, is no. In Antoine Goetz v. Burundi,
an investor brought a claim against Burundi after the country revoked the
investor’s exemptions from certain taxes and customs.103 The claimants requested
the tribunal to require Burundi to reinstate these exemptions.104 Finding Burundi’s
actions constituted an expropriation in violation of the Belgium-Burundi BIT, the
tribunal warned:
[I]t falls to the Republic of Burundi, in order to establish the conformity with
international law of the disputed decision to withdraw the certificate, to give
adequate and effective indemnity to the claimants as envisaged in Article 4 of
the Belgium-Burundi investment treaty, unless it prefers to return the benefit
of the free zone [exemption] regime to them. The choice lies within the
sovereign discretion of the Burundian government. If one of these two
measures is not taken within a reasonable period, the Republic of Burundi
will have committed an act contrary to international law the consequences of
which it would be left to the Tribunal to decide.105

The tribunal, hinting that it would issue an order for specific performance, never
followed through on its threat because the parties reached a settlement reinstating
the tax exemptions a few months later.106
In 2005, the ruling in Enron v. Argentina107 directly addressed whether ICSID
tribunals could issue an injunction.108 The claimants, contesting the newly imposed
taxes as unlawful expropriations, asked the tribunal to enjoin Argentina
permanently from collecting the taxes.109 Argentina argued that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction to issue such an order.110 The tribunal concluded: “An examination of
the powers of international courts and tribunals to order measures concerning
performance or injunction and of the ample practice that is available in this

103

104
105
106

(N.Z. v. Fr.), Award, 20 R.I.A.A. 215 (1990) [hereinafter Rainbow Warrior]; Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic (U.S. v. Libya), Award on the Merits, 19 January 1977, 53 I.L.R 389.
Goetz v. Republic of Burundi (Belg. v Burundi), ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award (Feb. 10,
1999), 15 ICSID REV.-F.I.L.J. 457 (2000) [hereinafter Goetz].
Id.
Id. at ¶ 133.
Schreuer, supra note 96, at 330.

107

Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Arg. Republic, (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 14, 2004), 11 ICSID Rep. 268 (2004) [hereinafter Enron].

108
109

Id.
Id.

110

Id.
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respect, leaves this Tribunal in no doubt about the fact that these powers are
indeed available.”111
Still, while the ICSID Convention and surrounding case law provide strong
support for the notion that ICSID tribunals retain the ability to grant injunctions,
states retain the right to limit the scope of this power. For example, Article 34 of
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides specifically that:
(1) [w]here a tribunal makes a final award against a respondent, the tribunal
may award, separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and any
applicable interest; and (b) restitution of property, in which case the award
shall provide that the respondent may pay monetary damages and any
applicable interest in lieu of restitution.112

Here, the U.S. strictly limits the remedies available to ICSID tribunals by requiring
monetary damages.113 To the extent that the tribunal believes restitution is
appropriate, the U.S. may choose either to return expropriated property or to
simply repay the monetary equivalent of that restitution.114 The prevalence of these
measures in existing BITs is unclear. For example, the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which
was at issue in Enron,115 has no such limits as currently written.116 In fact, the only
reference to awards that the treaty makes is to affirm (as is consistent with Article
53 of the ICSID Convention117) that “[a]ny arbitral award rendered pursuant to
this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute.”118 Thus, while
the U.S. Model BIT’s reformulation of the tribunal’s ability to define an applicable
award suggests that the state is aware, especially after Enron, of the broad grant of
power to tribunals in the ICSID Convention, it has delayed in incorporating any
meaningful limits into its existing treaties.
The example above demonstrates that the availability of non-pecuniary
remedies will very likely depend on the text of individual BITs. Furthermore, as
states continue to alter their investment regulatory regimes through either
amendment or withdrawal from the BIT system entirely, academic efforts to
generalize whether any given tribunal is authorized to grant an injunction will be
necessarily limited. Not only do states adopt different BIT drafting strategies,119
but these efforts may also be inconsistent over time. In these cases, practitioners
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

119

Id. at ¶ 79.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 24, at art. 34.
Id.
Id.
Enron, supra note 107.
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 48.
ISCID Convention, supra note 97.
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 48, at art. VII(6) (further requiring that “[e]ach Party undertakes to
carry out without delay the provisions of the award and to provide in its territory for its
enforcement”).
See Section III, supra.
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will not be able to rely on past experience or even past arbitral rulings to reach an
answer; rather, they must look to the relevant treaty provisions at issue. This may
strengthen the foreign investor’s incentive to forum shop.

B. Requirements for the Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies under
the FET Standard
If ICSID tribunals are capable of issuing non-pecuniary remedies, under
what circumstances, if any, can a tribunal resort to such remedies? Thus far, all
cases discussing the use of an injunction have concerned expropriation as the
underlying breach of the BITs. However, there is no reason to think that the
standard applied in expropriations cases would not also apply to FET breaches.
The tribunal in Enron signaled that it would adopt the standard endorsed by the
non-ICSID tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior Affair.120 The tribunal in Rainbow
Warrior established a two-part inquiry: whether (1) the state’s “wrongful act has a
continuing character;” and whether (2) “the violated rule is still in force at the time
in which the order is issued.”121
Applying this test to the facts of any number of FET violations would likely
qualify for non-pecuniary relief. Take, for example, the facts of Rompetrol.122 There,
the Dutch company TRG claimed that the Romanian General Prosecutor’s Office
violated (among other things) the applicable BIT’s FET provision during a series
of investigations into the company, including the detention and interrogation of
the company’s controlling stake owner, Dinu Patriciu, a Romanian national.123 The
tribunal acknowledged that a “pattern of wrongful conduct” may rise to the level
of an FET violation if the state fails to protect adequately the investor’s interests.124
Finding that the investigations failed to maintain the company’s legitimate
expectations, the Tribunal concluded that Romania had violated the FET
standard.125
In Rompetrol, the FET provision was still in effect at the time the Court issued
its order, and more importantly, the ongoing nature of the investigations makes
the violation a likely candidate for non-pecuniary relief under Rainbow Warrior.
This point is further strengthened by the fact that the claimant was unable to
120
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recover damages. Unlike the Suez tribunal, the tribunal in Rompetrol did not require
a showing of damages to qualify for a FET violation.126 Instead, should the
claimant seek a monetary reward, the tribunal required a showing that the violation
caused some economic loss.127 Because the claimant failed to do so, its request for
damages was denied, and the investor was left without a remedy.128 In this
scenario, a narrowly drafted injunction may better serve the claimant’s interests.129
The example above demonstrates circumstances where the issuance of nonpecuniary measures would not only be a valid exercise of international law but
also lead to a more equitable outcome than if only monetary awards were available.
Furthermore, while Rompetrol points to a situation where an injunction is used as
a sword, other circumstances suggest the injunction may be used as a shield. A
risk-averse investor will almost always elect to pursue damages. If the investor
runs into trouble with the state, it would likely wish to receive a cash award instead
of continuing with the relatively risky endeavor within the state. In many
circumstances, this outcome may be desirable because it encourages states to
conform to legitimate investor expectations, puts the wronged investor in the
same position as if the state had honored its commitments, and maintains the
state’s sovereign power to dictate domestic policy. However, at the same time,
such an outcome runs against the ultimate goal of BITs, which is to develop
nations through the importation of capital. Therefore, a state may prefer an
injunction because the remedy would preserve the incentive for investors to
remain in the host nation to continue their enterprise.
Here, the tools of contract law show the most promise. The law of specific
performance has long considered this problem, and while the piecemeal solution
in Antoine Goetz130 allowed the parties to reach an agreement, the outcome gives
little insight into the tribunal’s decision-making process. Application of the
principles of specific performance131 will add some clarity to the tribunal’s analysis.
Emphasis on the adequacy of damages132 purports to focus the tribunal on the
difficulty of proving damages, the difficulty of procuring a suitable substitute for
the breaching party’s performance, and the likelihood that an award of damages
will actually be collected. In the case of developing nations, all of these problems
126
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may be present, and to some degree, these concerns have been latent in many of
the decisions discussed above. Bringing these considerations to the forefront
stands only to aid parties in predicting the behavior of tribunals, thereby allowing
states and potential FET litigants to plan accordingly.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Comment has explored the current contours of the fair and equitable
treatment standard. In particular, the Comment has focused on how modern
iterations of the standard have brought an institutional crisis of legitimacy upon
the international investment arbitration regime. For years, tribunals have found
themselves facing a troublesome decision. Those bound by customary
international law find themselves incapable of providing predictable and
consistent statements of law that serve the complaints of investors. On the other
hand, those bound by the public law approach risk compromising the sovereignty
of states. For the time being, the schism between CIL and the list approach makes
a uniform application of the FET standard impossible. Although there is no single
solution that is likely to resolve the conflict of these interests, a starting point is
the imposition of predictable principles onto tribunal decisions to reduce the
existence or appearance of circularity or political impropriety. As such, this
Comment’s novel contribution is the extension of the contractual framework to
remedies. Relying on the ICSID’s broad grant to settle disputes through awards,
this Comment argues that non-pecuniary obligations can, in limited
circumstances, accomplish what other applications of the FET standard cannot.
By emphasizing the states’ consensual limitations on how they regulate, tribunals
may meaningfully restore their legitimacy.
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